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DON’T GROUND ME BRO! PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF 
AIRSPACE AND HOW IT INVALIDATES THE FAA’S BLANKET 
PROHIBITION ON LOW ALTITUDE COMMERCIAL DRONE 
OPERATIONS 
Pierce Giboney 
Abstract 
In years past, society has typically associated the word “drone” with 
the War on Terror and far-off battlefields. With the advent of the smart 
phone revolution, however, the once prohibitive costs of the technology 
have decreased to a level the general public can afford. As a consequence, 
a rising number of entrepreneurs associate the word “drone” with 
opportunity—a means of reaching a new commercial frontier, provided 
they can get off the ground. 
Purportedly due to the lack of a regulatory framework governing the 
new technology, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
essentially prohibited the use of drones at any altitude for “business 
purposes.” With the prohibition likely to remain in place for the 
foreseeable future, many of these would-be entrepreneurs choose to fly 
in open defiance of the FAA. Some of these drone pilots challenge 
whether the FAA even possesses the authority to impose the prohibition. 
The FAA responds to these challenges by insisting that it alone has the 
power to regulate the safety of all airspace “from the ground up.” 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that landowners retain a right 
to own the “superadjacent” airspace above their property, the Court has 
left undefined the precise limits of superadjacent airspace. However, 
utilizing drones provides an opportunity to define “superadjacent” and, 
more importantly, establish the outer limits of the FAA’s authority over 
the lower airspace. This Note argues that the FAA’s broad interpretation 
of its authority cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court decisions 
regarding landowners’ rights to own airspace above their property. This 
Note concludes that given the Supreme Court precedent, the FAA’s 
blanket prohibition on the use of drones for “business purposes” is an 
invalid exercise of its authority.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Louisiana farmers have a problem: feral hogs are ravaging their crops 
and farmland. This problem is serious enough that Louisiana allows 
people to hunt feral hogs almost without restriction.1 The relatively loose 
hunting restrictions, however, have been largely ineffective in checking 
the feral hog population.2 Intelligent enough to know that farmers will 
shoot them during the daytime, feral hogs often wait until dark before 
coming out to eat.3 With hunting and trapping proving to be inefficient, 
and other means of control being prohibitively expensive (e.g., hunting 
from helicopters), the noxious beasts appeared to be winning the war 
against their predators.4  
Enter Cy Brown’s “Dehogiflier,” a homemade drone equipped with a 
thermal imaging camera.5 Where the feral hog once used the heavy 
Louisiana brush and cover of darkness to evade their human predators, 
Brown and his team tipped the balance in favor of the farmers. He was so 
successful that the U.S. Department of Agriculture expressed an interest 
in adopting Brown’s method.6 The victory would prove to be short-lived: 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded Brown’s operation, 
and the feral hog, once again, reigns supreme over the Louisiana farmer.7 
Cy Brown is not alone. The FAA has grounded virtually any private 
individual or organization utilizing drones for commercial purposes.8 
Understandably, the subjects of the FAA’s blanket prohibition on flying 
drones—specifically, those flying drones at lower altitudes—have 
questioned the FAA’s justifications for doing so.  
One drone enthusiast, however, raised a more fundamental question. 
In response to a $10,000 enforcement action, Raphael Pirker questioned 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Michael Perot, Coping with Feral Hogs, LA. DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES, 
http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/publication/32954-feral-hogs/feral_hogs.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
 2. Julia O’Donoghue, Feral Hogs, the Unpopular Affordable Care Act and Smoking 
Restrictions: Capitol Digest, TIMES PICAYUNE (Apr. 04, 2014, 7:48 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/capitol_digest_april_4.html (“[Feral hogs] are 
prolific breeders. Experts say 75 percent of the wild hog population would have to be killed just 
to keep it to current levels.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Jesse Hirsch, Hunting Wild Pigs with Drones, MOD. FARMER (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://modernfarmer.com/2013/04/hunting-pigs-with-drones/. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Drone Wars: Who Owns the Air?, NPR (May 30, 2014, 3:03 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=317074394. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Delivery Drones Grounded by F.A.A., N.Y. TIMES: BITS (June 
25, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/delivery-drones-grounded-by-f-a-
a/; Heather Kelly, Beer-Delivery Drone Grounded by FAA, CNN (Feb. 3, 2014, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/31/tech/innovation/beer-drone-faa/. 
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not only whether the FAA was justified in imposing the fine, but whether 
the FAA even possessed the authority to do so.9 Specifically, Pirker 
maintained that the FAA lacked any jurisdictional authority to regulate 
aircraft, or even the airspace itself, below what the U.S. Supreme Court 
has declared to be in the public domain.10 In doing so, Pirker raised an 
old but ultimately unsettled issue: If a landowner maintains a property 
interest in the “superadjacent” airspace above her land, to what height 
does that interest extend? More importantly, what limitations does this 
impose on the FAA’s ability to regulate drones flying within that 
airspace? Answering those questions may prove critical in determining 
whether the FAA may ground operations such as Pirker’s for the 
foreseeable future.  
Part I of this Note introduces the current costs and capabilities of 
drone technology, provides insight into the adversarial relationship 
developing between drone enthusiasts and the FAA, and concludes with 
the facts and arguments raised in Huerta v. Pirker. Part II identifies the 
primary arguments the FAA raises to justify the prohibition and how 
those arguments relate to statutes governing the agency. Part III argues 
that the FAA’s broad interpretation of its own regulatory authority cannot 
be reconciled with the landowner’s right to privately own and develop 
airspace above his property, as established by the Supreme Court. Part IV 
reconciles the FAA’s regulatory authority with the right to privately own 
airspace and argues that the FAA cannot sustain its prohibition even 
under the broadest possible interpretation.  
I.  DRONE TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION 
The FAA broadly defines “drone,” or unmanned aircraft, as “a device 
that is used, or is intended to be used, for flight in the air with no onboard 
pilot.”11 The definition encompasses drones as simple as remotely 
controlled model aircrafts to complex drones used for sophisticated aerial 
surveillance over hostile areas.12 Drone weights currently range from as 
small as four ounces to over 32,000 pounds, with wingspans varying from 
six inches to over 240 feet.13  
As recently as ten years ago, the prohibitive cost of the technology 
(some of it classified) limited the use of drones largely to military 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See infra Section I.D. 
 10. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 10, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Sept. 
27, 2013) [hereinafter Pirker MTD], available at http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/upload/FAA-
v-Pirker.pdf. 
 11. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System (UAONAS), 72 Fed. 
Reg. 6689, 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,319, 14,319 (Mar. 9, 2012). 
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applications.14 With the advent of the smart phone revolution, however, 
the costs of essential drone components, such as accelerometers, 
gyroscopes, and GPS trackers, have decreased to a level the general 
public can afford.15 Consequently, where an advanced flight control 
system would have formerly cost between $5000 and $10,000, an entire 
drone flight platform—capable of flying twenty-two miles per hour and 
at altitudes up to 1000 feet—only costs $489 online.16 Drones of more 
limited capabilities, albeit still equipped with video cameras and other 
gadgets, cost less than $100 online.17  
Moreover, as costs have decreased, the technological capabilities of 
drones continue to dramatically increase. For instance, manufacturers can 
equip drones with state-of-the-art high-resolution cameras capable of 
viewing an object as small as six inches from 17,000 feet in the air.18 The 
Wireless Aerial Surveillance Platform, WASP), a drone weighing only 
fourteen pounds with a six-foot wingspan, is capable of not only hacking 
into personal Wi-Fi networks, but also rerouting and recording outgoing 
phone calls and text messages.19  
A.  Civil Drones: Proliferation and Projected Economic Impact 
The FAA estimates that “some 100 U.S. companies, academic 
institutions, and government organizations are developing over 300 
[drone] designs.”20 Though the FAA characterizes the number of units as 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Ben Popper, Drones over US Soil: The Calm Before the Swarm, VERGE (Mar. 19, 2013, 
1:00 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/3/19/4120548/calm-before-the-swarm-domestic-
drones-are-here; see also UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. at 6689 (“The most common public use of 
unmanned aircraft today in the United States is by the Department of Defense.”); Oren Gross, The 
New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (noting that drones 
“have become the poster child for America’s continuing fight against terrorism”). 
 15. Popper, supra note 14. 
 16. Id.; see also, e.g., DJI Phantom Aerial UAV Drone Quadcopter for GoPro, 
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/DJI-Phantom-Aerial-Drone-Quadcopter/dp/B00AGOS
QI8 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (showing the price of a drone on Amazon.com). This price of 
$489 was current as of the time of this Note. The price is subject to change.  
 17. See, e.g., UDI U818A 2.4GHz 4 CH 6 Axis Gyro RC Quadcopter with Camera RTF 
Mode 2, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/U818A-2-4GHz-Axis-Quadcopter-Camera/dp/
B00D3IN11Q/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
 18. See Ryan Gallagher, Could the Pentagon’s 1.8 Gigapixel Drone Camera Be Used for 
Domestic Surveillance?, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
future_tense/2013/02/06/argus_is_could_the_pentagon_s_1_8_gigapixel_drone_camera_be_use
d_for_domestic.html. 
 19. See Andy Greenberg, Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell Phones, 
FORBES (July 28, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/07/28/
flying-drone-can-crack-wifi-networks-snoop-on-cell-phones/. 
 20. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL 
YEARS 2010–2030, at 48 (2010), available at http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/2010-2030/media/2010%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf. 
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“small,” it forecasts that 30,000 drones will be flying over the United 
States by 2030.21 Where drones were once almost exclusively a 
government endeavor, everyone from real estate photographers to 
multinational corporations has recognized and seized on the affordability 
and rapidly increasing commercial (and noncommercial) potential of 
drone technology. 
Though drones already play a significant role in the public sphere 
(e.g., law enforcement, firefighting, border patrol, search and rescue22), 
“their application in commercial or civil use is equally diverse.”23 In the 
United States, both Amazon and Google are investing in and making 
headway with this technology. To reduce shipping costs and compete 
with the same-day delivery capabilities of its rivals, Amazon is currently 
developing and testing a drone-based delivery system.24 The purported 
goal of Amazon’s drone delivery system, Amazon Prime Air, is to “get 
packages into customers’ hands in 30 minutes or less using small 
unmanned aerial vehicles.”25 Amazon insists that Prime Air will be a 
delivery option “when and where we have the regulatory support needed 
to realize our vision.”26 Google is experimenting with a drone delivery 
system of its own. In August 2014, Google’s five-foot-wide drone 
prototype delivered candy, dog treats, cattle vaccines, water, and radios 
to farmers in Queensland, Australia.27 The “DomiCopter,” a drone 
developed by Domino’s Pizza, successfully delivered two pizzas in the 
United Kingdom last year.28 Other commercial applications include 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Id.  
 22. See Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 6, 
2014), http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153 [hereinafter FAA 
Fact Sheet]. 
 23. UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007). 
 24. See Jillian D’Onfro, Why Amazon Needs Drones More Than People Realize, BUS. 
INSIDER (July 30, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-drones-2014-7.  
 25. Amazon Prime Air, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8&node=
8037720011 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Alistair Barr & Greg Bensinger, Google Is Testing Delivery Drone System, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 29, 2014, 4:04 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-reveals-delivery-drone-project-
1409274480. 
 28. Julianne Pepitone, Domino’s Tests Drone Pizza Delivery, CNN MONEY (June 4, 2013, 
6:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/04/technology/innovation/dominos-pizza-drone/index. 
html. 
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filmmaking,29 real estate,30 and agriculture.31 
The FAA predicts that yearly spending on drones will double from 
$5.2 billion to $11.6 billion, increasing to more than $89 billion in the 
next decade.32 A 2013 research study conducted by the Association for 
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) estimates the 
economic impact of commercial drones will total more than $13.6 billion 
within three years of integration into the national airspace system.33 
AUVSI further estimates that integration “will create more than 34,000 
manufacturing jobs . . . and more than 70,000 new jobs” within the same 
time frame.34 Other estimates include an increase in state tax revenues 
totaling more than $482 million within the first eleven years following 
integration and the creation of 103,776 total jobs by 2025.35 AUVSI 
asserts that the United States loses more than $10 billion for every year 
that integration is delayed—a total loss of $27.6 million per day.36 
AUVSI concludes that “[t]he main inhibitor of U.S. commercial and civil 
development of [drones] is the lack of a regulatory structure.”37 
B.  Regulation of Drones and the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012 
The FAA distinguishes between “public aircraft” and “civil aircraft” 
for regulation purposes. A “public aircraft” is (1) an aircraft only used for 
governmental purposes, or (2) an aircraft owned or leased by the 
government and operated by any persons “for purposes related to crew 
training, equipment development, or demonstration.”38 A “civil aircraft” 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See, e.g., Neal Ungerleider, See What You Can Do with Drone Filmmaking, FAST CO. 
(Jan. 31, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.fastcocreate.com/1682320/see-what-you-can-do-with-
drone-filmmaking. 
 30. See, e.g., Rapti Gupta, Drones: Aerial Photos the Latest Real Estate Marketing Tool, 
REALTY TODAY (May 16, 2014, 4:48 AM), http://www.realtytoday.com/articles/5806/20140516/
drones-aerial-photos-latest-real-estate-marketing-tool.htm. 
 31. See, e.g., Chris Anderson, Agricultural Drones, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/526491/agricultural-drones/. 
 32. See Alan Levin, Drone Pilot Fine Test Industry Seen Reaching $89 Billion, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. (Oct. 24, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-24/drone-pilot-fine-
tests-industry-seen-reaching-89-billion.html. 
 33. DARRYL JENKINS & BIJAN VASIGH, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 
available at https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-9807 
-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/New_Economic%20Report%202013%20Full.pdf. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2015). 
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is anything other than a public aircraft.39 Generally, aircraft used for 
commercial purposes qualify as civil aircraft under FAA regulations.40  
The distinction between public and civil aircraft is relevant in that the 
FAA may not regulate or impose specific safety requirements on aircraft 
classified as public.41 Currently, the only way for a civil drone operator 
to access the national airspace system is to apply for and obtain an 
experimental airworthiness certificate from the FAA.42 Historically, the 
FAA has been extremely reluctant to issue airworthiness certificates to 
private entities.43 Operating commercial drones at any altitude is 
essentially prohibited—prior to September 2014, the FAA certified only 
two commercial drone models, both limited to Artic airspace.44  
Recognizing that commercial and civil drone use was far outpacing 
the FAA’s promulgation of regulations, the federal government enacted 
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA).45 The 
legislation mandates that the FAA develop a plan to safely integrate civil 
drones into the national airspace system by September 30, 2015.46 The 
plan must include, among other things, “recommendations or 
projections . . . on how the rulemaking will define . . . the acceptable 
standards for operation and certification of [drones].”47 The FMRA also 
requires the establishment of six test ranges for “develop[ing] 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. (defining “commercial purposes” as “the transportation of persons or property for 
compensation or hire”). 
 41. See Testimony—Statement of Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for 
Regulation and Certification Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. on Role of FAA in 
Safety Oversight of Forest Service Firefighting Operations, 109th Cong. (2004), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news_story.cfm?newsId=6151&print=go. 
 42. FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 22. 
 43. See Michael Berry & Nabiha Syed, The FAA’s Slow Move to Regulate Domestic 
Drones, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/09/24/the-faas-slow-move-to-regulate-domestic-drones/. 
 44. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240 (last updated Mar. 07, 2014). In September 
2014, the FAA granted six aerial photography companies exemptions to use drones in a limited 
capacity. David Robb, FAA Approves Drone Use for Hollywood Productions, Sets Guidelines—
Update, DEADLINE (Sept. 25, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://deadline.com/2014/09/drones-hollywood-
faa-approves-841265/. The FAA granted exemptions to four more companies the following 
December. Alwyn Scott, UPDATE 2-U.S. OK’s More Commercial Drone Use as Congress 
Probes Risks, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/10/
usa-drones-faa-idUSL1N0TU0Z820141210. 
 45. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 46. Id. § 332(a)(3). 
 47. Id. § 332(a)(2). 
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certification standards and air traffic requirements for [drones, both civil 
and public].”48  
However, the legislation notably prohibits the FAA from 
“promulgat[ing] any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an 
aircraft being developed as a model aircraft,” provided certain conditions 
are met.49 These conditions require that the model aircraft be “flown 
strictly for hobby or recreational use,” not weigh over fifty-five pounds, 
and not be operated in a manner that interferes with the flight of manned 
aircraft.50 The FAA may, however, “pursue enforcement action against 
persons operating model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national 
airspace system.”51  
At the current pace, the FAA is unlikely to meet the 2015 integration 
deadline. A 2014 report released by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation states that the FAA missed the statutory milestones for 
most of the drone-related provisions of the FMRA, including a mandate 
to issue a final rule by August 2014 for small drone operations.52  
C.  The Tumultuous Relationship Between the FAA and  
Civil Drone Operators 
With the prospects of the FAA implementing a workable regulatory 
framework and certification process in the near future looking 
increasingly dim, the near-blanket ban on commercial drone use has led 
to a high degree of tension between citizen drone 
enthusiasts/entrepreneurs and the FAA. The FAA has issued at least 
seventeen cease-and-desist letters to drone operators since 2012.53 The 
activities targeted in the FAA’s letters include commercial 
cinematography, aerial photography, tornado research, inspection of gas 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. § 332(c). 
 49. Id. § 336(a).  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 336(b) (emphasis added). In sum, the FAA may not promulgate rules or regulations 
regarding model aircraft but may pursue enforcement actions against model aircraft operated in a 
manner that endangers airspace in the public domain. See infra Section IV.B.  
 52. See Memorandum from Matthew E. Hampton, Assistant Inspector Gen. for Aviation 
Audits, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Fed. Aviation Admin. (June 26, 2014), in U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
AUDIT REPORT: FAA FACES SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO SAFELY INTEGRATE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 2 [hereinafter Hampton Memorandum], 
available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Unmanned 
%20Aircraft%20Systems%5E6-26-14.pdf. 
 53. Matthew Schroyer, FAA Cease and Desist Letters Show Agency’s Attempts to Control 
Drone Use in the US, PROF. SOC’Y OF DRONE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.dronejourn 
alism.org/news/2014/2/faa-cease-and-desist-letters-show-agencys-attempts-to-control-drone-use 
-in-the-us [hereinafter C&D Letters] (compiling copies of the FAA’s cease and desist letters and 
discussing their contents). 
9
Giboney: Don't Ground Me Bro!: Private Ownership of Airspace and How It In
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
2158 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
well stacks, and “journalism education[].”54 Though the cease-and-desist 
letters detail the means by which a civil operator may obtain authorization 
to fly, many of the letters clearly state that the FAA prohibits drones 
operated for commercial use.55  
In response, some high-end commercial operators are considering 
moving their operations to countries with more favorable regulations.56 
However, the FAA’s prohibition has done little, if anything, to dissuade 
the low-end drone user from continuing to fly. The low barriers to 
entering the drone market have promulgated an underground economy 
composed of wedding and real estate photographers, rural farmers, and 
teenagers—all confident that their limited activities will escape the 
FAA’s attention.57 
One major (perhaps the major) source of tension arises from the 
apparent disagreement that commercial drones—at least those that 
qualify under the model aircraft exception—are beyond, or should be 
beyond, the FAA’s authority to regulate.58 As a threshold issue to this, it 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See id.; Jason Koebler, These Are the Companies the FAA Has Harassed for Using 
Drones, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 6, 2014, 3:20 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/these-are-
the-companies-the-faa-has-harassed-for-using-drones.  
 55. C&D Letters, supra note 53; see also Julianne Chiaet, Drone Pilot Challenges FAA on 
Commercial Flying Ban, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ 
drone-pilot-challenges-faa-commercial-flying-ban/ (“[I]n 2007 the FAA turned its attention to 
model airplanes once again. Now termed drones . . ., the agency banned their use for business 
purposes.”). 
 56. See Chad Garland, Drones May Provide Big Lift to Agriculture When FAA Allows Their 
Use, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-drones-
agriculture-20140913-story.html (stating that the FAA’s strict regulations have caused 
manufacturers of agricultural drones to market their products overseas); see also Letter from Paul 
Misener, Vice President of Global Pub. Policy, Amazon.com, to Michael P. Huerta, Fed. Aviation 
Adm’r, 2 (July 9, 2014), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jul/usa-amazon-
delivery-drones.pdf (“Because Amazon is a commercial enterprise we have been limited [by the 
current FAA rules] to conducting R&D flights indoors or in other countries. Of course, Amazon 
would prefer to keep the focus, jobs, and investment of this important research and development 
initiative in the United States by conducting private research and development operations 
outdoors near Seattle . . . .”). 
 57. Some openly defy the FAA. See, e.g., Kevin Robillard, FAA Risks Losing Drone War, 
POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/federal-aviation-
administration-faa-drones-103800_Page2.html (noting that “acts of defiance against the FAA ban 
are becoming more blatant”); Jack Nicas & Andy Pasztor, FAA, Drones Clash on Rules for 
Unmanned Aircraft, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2014, 8:43 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/S 
B10001424052702303851804579556144292258188 (“Mike Fortin, president of an Orlando, 
Fla., drone company that films concerts and TV commercials, received an email from an FAA 
official in January telling him that his business was violating FAA policy. ‘My response to the 
FAA was to piss off,’ he said. The FAA hasn’t followed up.”). 
 58. The FAA itself acknowledges this situation.  See UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 
(Feb. 13, 2007) (“The FAA recognizes that people and companies other than modelers might be 
flying [drones] with the mistaken understanding that they are legally operating under the authority 
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is unclear exactly what types of drone activities constitute “commercial” 
uses. For instance, real estate agents who fly drones to photograph listings 
have insisted that because they are not directly charging money for drone 
service, they qualify as hobbyists rather than commercial users,59 an 
argument that the FAA explicitly rejects.60 The FAA’s extension of its 
definition of “commercial” to volunteer nonprofit organizations utilizing 
drones for what are clearly noncommercial operations (e.g., search-and-
rescue missions) has only strained this relationship further.61 Recently, 
these issues have moved beyond public debate and into the courtroom.  
D.  Raphael Pirker Challenges the FAA 
Swiss-born Raphael Pirker—famous for his aerial videos of the Statue 
of Liberty, the French Alps, and a cruise ship—is a legend among the 
drone underground.62 Pirker flies a “Ritewing Zephyr,” a styrofoam 
radio-controlled airplane weighing approximately 4.5 pounds and 
equipped with a high-definition video camera.63 In 2011, an advertising 
company hired Pirker to take aerial photographs and video of the 
University of Virginia.64 Two years after uploading video of the flight to 
his website,65 the FAA notified Pirker that it was assessing a $10,000 civil 
penalty against him for, among other things, allegedly operating his drone 
“for compensation” and “in a careless or reckless manner” at altitudes of 
less than 400 feet above the University.66 In response, Pirker filed a 
motion to dismiss the FAA’s Order of Assessment with the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).67 
 
                                                                                                                     
of AC 91-57. AC 91-57 only applies to modelers, and thus specifically excludes its use by persons 
or companies for business purposes.”). 
 59. Teke Wiggin, FAA Says Realtors Who Fly Drones to Shoot Listing Photos Are Not 
Hobbyists, INMAN (June 25, 2014), http://www.inman.com/2014/06/25/faa-says-realtors-who-fly-
drones-to-shoot-listing-photos-are-not-hobbyists/ (stating that “agents will sometimes say they 
are charging for photo or video editing, not drone flights”). 
 60. Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,172, 36,174 (June 
25, 2014) (stating that “[a] realtor using a model aircraft to photograph a property that he is trying 
to sell and using the photos in the property’s real estate listing” is “[n]ot hobby or recreation”). 
 61. See, e.g., Jason Koebler, A Search-and-Rescue Group Is Fighting the FAA for the Right 
to Use Drones, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 7, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/a-
search-and-rescue-group-is-fighting-the-faa-for-the-right-to-use-drones. 
 62. See Jason Koebler, Drones Could Be Coming to American Skies Sooner Than You 
Think, POLITICO (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/drones-faa-
lawsuit-coming-to-american-skies-102754.html. 
 63. Pirker MTD, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
 64. Id. at 3. 
 65. See Chiaet, supra note 55.  
 66. Order of Assessment at 2–3, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. June 27, 2013) 
[hereinafter NTSB Order of Assessment], available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/
threatlevel/2014/10/Complaint.pdf. 
 67. See Pirker MTD, supra note 10. 
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Pirker sought dismissal on multiple grounds, including the following: 
(1) the FAA may not regulate, and has never attempted to regulate, model 
airplanes; (2) the “policy statements” issued by the FAA regarding model 
airplanes do not qualify as valid administrative rule making and are 
therefore unenforceable; and (3) to the extent the FAA’s policy 
statements may be an interpretive rule, an interpretation distinguishing 
between drones used for recreational and commercial purposes is 
erroneous “and must be rejected.”68  
One of Pirker’s specific contentions also threatens to resurrect a 
previously unsettled and largely dormant issue and thrust it back into the 
limelight:  
The FAA also lacks jurisdiction. At a minimum, partial 
dismissal of the Complaint is warranted as to all allegations 
concerning operation at very low altitudes, inside a tunnel, 
below tree top level, or underneath a pedestrian overpass 
because these locations are not “navigable airspace” 
subject to FAA jurisdiction. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102 
(“navigable airspace means airspace above the minimum 
altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations . . . including 
airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing 
of aircraft.”).69 
In its response to Pirker’s motion, the FAA, though conceding that 
Pirker had accurately defined “navigable airspace,” emphatically rejected 
the idea that its jurisdiction was so limited.70 Instead, the FAA insisted 
that its regulatory authority extends to “the use of all airspace over the 
United States by both civil and military aircraft.”71 
On March 6, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Patrick G. Geraghty 
granted Pirker’s motion, vacated the FAA’s Order of Assessment, and 
terminated the proceedings.72 Assuming that Pirker’s radio-controlled 
plane was a model aircraft, Judge Geraghty ruled that the FAA’s policy 
memoranda are not binding upon the general public, and thus the FAA 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 4–13. 
 69. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 70. Administrator’s Response to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 4–5, Huerta v. Pirker, 
No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter FAA Response], available at 
http://www.suasnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/FAA_Response.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Christenson, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned 
Aircraft, supra note 44 (“The FAA is responsible for the safety of U.S. airspace from the ground 
up. This misperception [that the FAA does not control airspace below 400 feet] may originate 
with the idea that manned aircraft generally must stay at least 500 feet above the ground.”). 
 72. Decisional Order at 8, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 2014) 
[hereinafter Pirker Order], available at https://app.ntsb.gov/legal/pirker/Pirker-CP-217.pdf. 
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currently lacks the regulatory authority to classify model aircraft as a 
drone.73 He further ruled that because the FAA lacks regulatory authority 
over model aircraft, Pirker’s operation was subject only to the voluntary 
compliance standards of Advisory Circular 91-57.74  
The FAA immediately appealed the decision to the full NTSB. 
Finding that Pirker’s drone met the statutory definition of “aircraft” and 
was, therefore, subject to 14 C.F.R. § 91.13,75 the NTSB reversed Judge 
Geraghty’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.76 
Pirker ultimately settled with the FAA for $1100 in January 2015, “solely 
to avoid the expense of litigation.”77 
The issue of whether the FAA’s jurisdiction reaches beyond the 
confines of navigable airspace has remained relatively dormant for 
decades, and neither Judge Geraghty nor the NTSB addressed it. That the 
question has remained unaddressed is, presumably, a testament to both 
its difficulty and the fact that courts can easily avoid deciding the issue 
in a world where commercial air safety generally requires flight at 
altitudes higher than 500 feet. But that sky has fallen. In an airspace 
densely occupied (potentially) by package delivering quad-copters and 
real estate photographers, this issue is of substantial importance. 
Although the FAA insists that it “is responsible for the safety of U.S. 
airspace from the ground up,”78 critics vehemently maintain that the 
FAA’s jurisdiction does not extend to the lower airspace.79 Were a court 
to take on the airspace issue, the outcome would have critical 
implications. A finding that the FAA has limited or no jurisdiction below 
navigable airspace would leave regulation of low-altitude drones almost 
totally in the hands of state and local governments—an assuredly less 
restrictive outcome and one that, presumably, drone enthusiasts and 
entrepreneurs would favor. An opposite finding, however, would likely 
ground operations such as Pirker’s for the foreseeable future, at least 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 5. 
 74. Id. at 7. AC 91-57 is an FAA advisory circular, issued in 1981, which “outlines, and 
encourages voluntary compliance with, safety standards for model aircraft operators.” U.S. DEP’T 
OF TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57 (1981), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf. 
 75. This regulation states that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless 
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014).  
 76. Opinion and Order at 7–11, Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 18, 2014) 
[hereinafter Pirker Opinion and Order], available at https://app.ntsb.gov/legal/pirker/5730.pdf. 
 77. Settlement Agreement, Huerta v Pirker, No. CP-217 (N.T.S.B. Jan. 16, 2015), available 
at http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/pirkerdeal.pdf. 
 78. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44. 
 79. E.g., Peter Sachs, FAA’s Myth Busting Page Now Mirrors Losing Pleadings, DRONE-
RSS (Mar. 9, 2014),  http://drone-rss.com/2014/03/faas-myth-busting-page-now-mirrors-losing-
pleadings/ (arguing that under the FAA’s logic, “the FAA would have jurisdiction if two frisbees 
were to collide in a backyard”). 
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given the FAA’s actions and stated intentions so far. Though Pirker has 
settled his case, it is likely that similar cases will increasingly find their 
way into the courtroom and, in time, force the courts to decide the issue 
of whether and to what degree the FAA’s jurisdiction extends to non-
navigable airspace. 
II.  THE FAA’S ARGUMENT FOR DRONE PROHIBITION 
In response to the dramatic increase in drone operations “during the 
past several years in both the public and private sectors,” the FAA issued 
a 2005 policy memorandum to “provide[] guidance . . . to determine if 
[drones] may be allowed to conduct flight operations in the U.S. National 
Airspace System.”80 Two years later, the FAA published FAA Notice 07-
01 in the Federal Register stating that “the current FAA policy for [drone] 
operations is that no person may operate a [drone] in the National 
Airspace System without specific authority.”81 However, “policy 
statements of an agency are not . . . binding upon the general public.”82 
In Pirker, Judge Geraghty specifically addressed Notice 07-01, stating 
that “as a statement of policy, [Notice 07-01] cannot be considered as 
establishing a rule or enforceable regulation . . . . [and] does not . . . meet 
the criteria for valid legislative rulemaking.”83 As of September 2015, the 
FAA has not promulgated any enforceable rules that specifically regulate 
drone operations.84 Thus, the FAA’s ability to regulate and prohibit the 
use of drones for business purposes must necessarily derive from the 
same statutory and regulatory authority that existed prior to the 
prohibition.  
Congress has declared that “[t]he United States Government has 
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States” and that “[a] 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Memorandum, Fed. Aviation Admin., Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations in the 
U.S. National Airspace System—Interim Operational Approval Guidance (Sept. 16, 2005), 
available at http://www.uavm.com/images/AFS-400_05-01_faa_uas_policy.pdf. 
 81. UAONAS, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007). 
 82. Pirker Order, supra note 72, at 1, 5; see also Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. 
Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A general statement of policy . . . does not establish a 
‘binding norm.’ It is not finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed. The 
agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law because a general statement 
of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy.”). 
 83. Pirker Order, supra note 72, at 6. 
 84. See Pirker Opinion and Order, supra note 76, at 1, 9 (“The Board has affirmed the 
Administrator’s application of § 91.13(a) as an alleged independent violation in other cases in 
which, presumably, no other regulation would have explicitly prohibited [Raphael Pirker’s] 
conduct.” (emphasis added)); Hampton Memorandum, supra note 52 (stating that the “FAA has 
not established a regulatory framework for [drone] integration, such as aircraft certification 
requirements, standard air traffic procedures for safely managing [drones] with manned aircraft, 
or an adequate controller training program for managing [drones]”). 
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citizen of the United States has a public right of transit through the 
navigable airspace.”85 Section 40103 tasks the Administrator of the FAA 
with developing “plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace 
and assign[ing] by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary 
to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace.”86 The 
Administrator is to “prescribe air traffic regulations . . . for—(A) 
navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft; (B) protecting individuals 
and property on the ground; (C) using the navigable airspace efficiently; 
and (D) preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land 
or water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.”87  
“Aircraft” is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 40102 as “any contrivance 
invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”88 Also relevant 
is 14 CFR § 91.13, which states that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft 
in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of 
another.”89 Aside from § 91.13 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the 
FAA rarely cites to any specific statute or regulation authorizing the 
grounding of drones used for commercial purposes.90 Nevertheless, one 
can deduce how the FAA interprets its statutory and regulatory authority 
as applying to drones by examining the numerous cease-and-desist letters 
issued by the FAA, as well as the arguments it raises in the Pirker dispute.  
Many of the FAA’s cease-and-desist letters state that “[t]he FAA has 
the requirement for the regulation and safe operation of the National 
Airspace System which covers all navigable airspace in the US.”91 
“Navigable airspace” is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 40102 as the “airspace 
above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this 
subpart and subpart III of this part, including airspace needed to ensure 
safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft.”92 Minimum altitudes of 
flight are described as, generally, 1000 feet above the highest obstacle 
over congested areas and 500 feet above the surface over non-congested 
areas, except when necessary for taking off and landing.93  
Thus, the FAA’s above statement, on its own, would suggest that the 
FAA’s mandate does not extend to drone operations, such as Pirker’s, 
flying below navigable airspace. Three of the cease-and-desist letters, 
however, further state that “[p]rivate land owners do not have any 
                                                                                                                     
 85. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (2012). 
 86. Id. § 40103(b)(1). 
 87. Id. § 40103(b)(2). 
 88. Id. § 40102(a)(6). 
 89. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2015). 
 90. See infra Section IV.C. 
 91. C&D Letters, supra note 53 (emphasis added). 
 92. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 93. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)–(c) (2015). 
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jurisdiction over the airspace above their property and cannot prohibit or 
allow aviation operations over their land.”94 This statement implies that 
the FAA interprets its mandate as extending to the safe operation and 
regulation of not just navigable airspace but all airspace—an 
interpretation expressly confirmed by the FAA.95 
In response to Pirker’s contention that the FAA “lacks 
jurisdiction . . . at very low altitudes . . . because these locations are not 
‘navigable airspace’ subject to FAA jurisdiction,”96 the FAA stated: 
The Respondent accurately cites the definition of “navigable 
airspace;” however, that definition does not in any way, 
explicitly or implicitly, define the outer limits of the FAA’s 
authority to regulate airspace. In sum, the FAA’s mandate to 
regulate the use of all airspace necessary to “ensure the 
safety” of aircraft, for “protecting, and identifying” those 
aircraft, and for “protecting individuals on the ground” is not 
confined solely to the “navigable airspace.”97 
The quoted language in the second sentence of the FAA’s statement 
derives from 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2)(A)–(D). However, in insisting that 
the outer limits of its authority are not limited by definition of navigable 
airspace, the FAA is actually interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1), which 
states: 
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
shall develop plans and policy for the use of the navigable 
airspace and assign by regulation or order the use of the 
airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the 
efficient use of airspace. The Administrator may modify or 
revoke an assignment when required in the public interest.98  
Thus, in insisting that it “is responsible for the safety of U.S. airspace 
from the ground up,”99 the FAA clearly reads “use of the airspace 
necessary” as having meaning independent of “for the use of navigable 
airspace.” Stated differently, the FAA has interpreted § 40103(b)(1) as a 
dual mandate: the FAA must develop plans and policies for the use of 
navigable airspace as well as ensure the safety of all airspace (and 
aircraft), regardless of altitude. 
Does § 40103 authorize the FAA to regulate the safety of all airspace 
rather than just that in the public domain? To justify a blanket prohibition 
                                                                                                                     
 94. C&D Letters, supra note 53. 
 95. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44. 
 96. Pirker MTD, supra note 10, at 10. 
 97. FAA Response, supra note 70, at 5. 
 98. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012). 
 99. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44. 
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on the use of drones for business purposes, flying safely below navigable 
airspace, requires the FAA to answer that question in the affirmative.100 
If, however, the answer to that question is no, then it is highly unlikely 
that the FAA has any authority to ground low-altitude drone operations 
such as Pirker’s. Answering this critical question requires examining 
previous airspace disputes between the federal government and property 
owners. 
III.  LANDOWNERS’ RIGHTS TO “SUPERADJACENT” AIRSPACE AND 
HOW IT LIMITS THE FAA’S JURISDICTION 
Prior to the advent of aviation, the predominant theory of airspace 
property rights were expressed in the Roman Law maxim cujus est solum, 
ejus est usque ad coelom (commonly translated as “whoever has the land 
possesses all the space upwards to an indefinite extent”).101 The rule, 
incorporated into the English common law system with the support of Sir 
Edward Coke and Lord William Blackstone, would eventually make its 
way across the Atlantic and firmly establish itself in the United States.102 
This all changed, however, on December 17, 1903, when “two daring 
American brothers near Kitty Hawk, North Carolina sparked a 
technological revolution that would soon bring Lord Coke’s well-
reasoned doctrine crashing in upon itself.”103 
With the rapid expansion of civil aviation leading up to and following 
World War II, the traditional legal framework proved wholly inadequate 
in addressing the onslaught of airspace trespass and nuisance cases.104 
The legal challenge was twofold: granting absolute airspace rights to 
property owners would threaten to stifle a young and flourishing form of 
commerce, while “allow[ing] every low-flying barnstormer to terrorize 
rural communities with no consequence seemed an equally bad 
alternative.”105  
Believing that the young, but burgeoning, airplane industry “could not 
reach its full commercial potential without federal action,” Congress 
passed the Air Commerce Act in 1926.106 The legislation charged the 
Secretary of Commerce with, among other things, fostering air commerce 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See infra Part IV. 
 101. Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 
56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 161 (1990). 
 102. Id. at 161–62. 
 103. Id. at 162. 
 104. Id. at 162–63. 
 105. Id. at 163. 
 106. See A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ (last updated Feb. 19, 2015, 4:23 PM). 
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and improving and maintaining safety standards.107 This law included a 
provision stating that “Congress hereby declares that the Government of 
the United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete 
sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the United 
States.”108 The Air Commerce Act, however, applied only to interstate 
flights and further complicated the “aerial trespass question.”109  
Under federal law, planes had to be at least five hundred or 
one thousand feet above the ground, but under state law there 
was no guarantee that they could be above the ground at all. 
Everything depended on the law of the particular state. And 
to make matters even stranger, in the first reported case 
testing the constitutionality of the Air Commerce Act, a 
federal judge suggested that the minimum altitude 
requirements might not be lawfully applied to intrastate 
flights in the first place.110 
The Aeronautics Branch, previously tasked with aviation oversight, 
was renamed the Bureau of Air Commerce in 1934.111 However, at this 
point, the Bureau had no radio link with aircraft, and local governments 
continued to operate airport towers.112 The public outcry in response to a 
number of high-profile plane accidents113 prompted President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to sign the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938.114  
The Act established the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) and 
expanded the federal government’s role in aviation by granting the CAA 
the power to regulate airline fares and routes.115 The Act—in the wake of 
prior Supreme Court decisions substantially broadening Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce (as well as “five 
cases . . . conclud[ing] that flights at high altitudes were not 
trespasses”)—also did away with the intrastate/interstate distinction and 
declared a “public right of freedom of transit . . . through the navigable 
air space” for all flights.116 While the Act definitively settled who 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568. 
 108. Id. (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2012)). 
 109. STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM 
THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 167 (2008). 
 110. Id.  
 111. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 106. 
 112. Id. 
 113. One such accident involved football legend Knute Rockne. See Herbert M. Friedman & 
Ada Kera Friedman, The Legacy of the Rockne Crash, AEROPLANE MAG. (May 2001), available 
at http://www.irishlegends.com/pages/reflections/reflections49.html. 
 114. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 106. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See BANNER, supra note 109, at 199 (quoting Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. 
No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973). 
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controlled the airspace at higher altitudes, exactly who controlled the 
airspace below the public domain remained an open question.117  
A.  Establishing the Landowner’s Right to Own  
“Superadjacent” Airspace 
Thomas Causby owned and maintained a chicken farm on 2.8 acres of 
land near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina.118 The federal 
government leased the airport in 1942.119 Before long, four-motored 
bombers and other heavy planes were frequently passing over the 
Causbys’ property “in considerable numbers and rather close 
together.”120 The approved glide path of the airport’s northwest–
southeast runway passed directly over the Causbys’ farm at extremely 
low altitudes.121  
The noise proved to be too much for the Causbys’ chickens, which 
Causby stated “[would] get excited and jump against the side of the 
chicken house and the walls and burst themselves open and die.”122 
Losing their chicken business (and perhaps their sanity) as a result, the 
Causbys filed suit against the U.S. government.123 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, noting that the issue was one of first impression as well 
as noting its importance.124 
The government argued that since the military flights were within the 
minimum safe altitudes of flight as prescribed by the CAA and because 
there had been no physical invasion of the Causbys’ property, there had 
been no compensable Fifth Amendment taking.125 The government’s 
primary argument, however, was that the Causbys did not “own [the] 
superadjacent airspace which [they have] not subjected to possession by 
the erection of structures or other occupancy,” and hence the Causbys 
possessed no property that the government could have taken.126 
                                                                                                                     
 117. Id. at 199–200. 
 118. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 259. 
 121. Id. at 258–59 (stating that the aircrafts “come close enough at times to appear barely to 
miss the tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves 
off”). 
 122. BANNER, supra note 109, at 229 (stating that Thomas Causby purportedly lost 150 
chickens in this manner). 
 123. Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 124. Causby, 328 U.S. at 258. 
 125. Id. at 260. 
 126. Id.; BANNER, supra note 109, at 242. 
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Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the Court, addressed the latter 
argument first, declaring that cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelom 
“has no place in the modern world.”127 He reasoned: 
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were 
that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject the 
operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts 
at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the airspace 
would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their 
control and development in the public interest, and transfer 
into private ownership that to which only the public has a 
just claim.128 
However, Justice Douglas then stated that the above principle would 
not control the Causbys’ case.129 Framing the issue as a loss of land rather 
than airspace, Justice Douglas rejected the government’s contention that 
a landowner had no proprietary interest in the airspace above his 
property.130 He stated: 
We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is 
obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the 
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate 
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings 
could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even 
fences could not be run. . . . The landowner owns at least as 
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use 
in connection with the land.131 
Further, Justice Douglas reasoned that a landowner’s failure to 
physically occupy the airspace above his property is immaterial, stating 
that “[a]s we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but 
do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a 
more conventional entry upon it.”132 He continued, “While the owner 
does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make 
use of it in the conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the same 
sense that space left between buildings for the purpose of light and air is 
used.”133 Justice Douglas concluded, “We think that the landowner, as an 
incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in 
the same category as invasions of the surface.”134 
                                                                                                                     
 127. Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61. 
 128. Id. at 261. 
 129. Id. 
 130. BANNER, supra note 109, at 252. 
 131. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 265. 
 134. Id. 
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Justice Douglas’s holding in Causby firmly established that the 
landowner retains ownership of at least some of the airspace above her 
property. But how much? “[A]s much of the space above the ground as 
he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”135 On the other hand, 
the Court expressly stated that a landowner may not convert into private 
ownership airspace within the public domain.136 This raised another 
question: At what point does public ownership of the airspace begin and 
private ownership end? The Court addressed the former without 
addressing the latter.137  
In his holding, Justice Douglas notably equated airspace in the public 
domain with navigable airspace stating that “[t]he navigable airspace 
which Congress has placed in the public domain is ‘airspace above the 
minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority.’”138 When the Court decided Causby, the minimum safe 
altitude prescribed by the CAA was 500 feet during the day and 1000 feet 
at night.139 Because the aircraft flying over the Causbys’ farm were below 
navigable airspace, Justice Douglas reasoned that “the flights in question 
were not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed within the 
public domain.”140 Thus, Thomas Causby had a valid claim.  
Noting that the CAA has “the power to prescribe air traffic rules,”141 
the Court appears to suggest that redefining minimum safe altitudes of 
flight might avoid claims such as Causby’s. Justice Douglas anticipated 
the issue but did not address it, stating only that if the CAA “prescribed 
83 feet as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the 
question of the validity of the regulation.”142  
Causby establishes two crucial points in determining the extent of the 
FAA’s authority: (1) a private landowner owns as much of the airspace, 
below the airspace Congress has placed within the public domain, “as 
[he] can occupy or use in connection with the land”; and (2) the minimum 
altitudes of flight, as defined by Congress, determine the outer limits of 
airspace owned by the public.143 However, an important question 
remained: though it is clear that public airspace may not be incorporated 
into private ownership, is the converse also true? May privately owned 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at 264. 
 136. Id. at 261. 
 137. Id. at 266 (stating that “[t]he airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, 
is part of the public domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are”). 
 138. Id. at 263 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 180). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 264. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 263. Eighty-three feet was the approximate altitude of the military aircraft flying 
over Thomas Causby’s farm. Id. at 258. 
 143. Id. at 264. 
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airspace be incorporated into the public domain without invading a 
private property interest by merely revising the definition of “navigable 
airspace,” i.e., by lowering the “minimum safe altitudes of flight”?144 
When the Court decided Causby, the airspace required for taking off 
or landing was not “within the navigable airspace which Congress placed 
within the public domain.”145 Had that airspace been included, the Court 
noted, the government would have been immune from Causby’s claim.146 
Largely in response to the shift in the nature and targets of airspace 
lawsuits resulting from the Causby decision, Congress redefined 
navigable airspace to include “airspace needed to insure safety in take-
off and landing of aircraft.”147 
Now, there is no question that the glide paths above the Causbys’ 
property were within navigable airspace. Could the affected landowner 
still sustain a Causby-type claim now that planes were taking off and 
landing in statutorily defined public airspace? Stated differently, if planes 
were flying in airspace Congress had formally dedicated to the public, 
how could the affected landowner claim that his rights to his airspace had 
been violated? Interestingly, Justice Douglas would answer this question, 
hinted at by himself in Causby, sixteen years later in Griggs v. Alleghany 
County.148 
The facts in Griggs are markedly similar to those in Causby. In 
Griggs, planes taking off from a nearby airport’s newly constructed 
runway “observed regular flight patterns ranging from 30 feet to 300 feet 
over [Thomas Griggs’s] residence.”149 Griggs alleged that the low-flying 
aircraft made it impossible for people to “converse or to talk on the 
telephone” and that they were “frequently unable to sleep even with ear 
plugs and sleeping pills.”150 
In a short opinion, Justice Douglas held that, despite the fact that the 
aircraft were operating in accordance with federal regulations and flying 
within navigable airspace, a taking had occurred.151 Relying on his prior 
decision in Causby, Justice Douglas stated:  
                                                                                                                     
 144. 49 U.S.C. § 180 (2012). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. BANNER, supra note 109, at 259 (“Landowners had once sued pilots and airplane owners 
for trespass and nuisance; now, more often than not, they sued government-owned airports for 
violations of the Takings Clause or its state constitutional analogues. In the 1950s, as they 
acquired jet engines, planes grew larger and louder, and they needed longer and shallower glide 
paths on takeoff and landing. Meanwhile the volume of air traffic continued to increase, so there 
was never any shortage of aggrieved landowners near airports . . . .”). 
 148. 369 U.S. 84 (1962). 
 149. Id. at 87. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 88–89. 
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[T]he use of land presupposes the use of some of the airspace 
above it. Otherwise no home could be built, no tree planted, 
no fence constructed, no chimney erected. An invasion of the 
“superadjacent airspace” will often “affect the use of the 
surface of the land itself.”152 
Justice Douglas concluded, “[Alleghany County] in designing [the 
airport and glide path] had to acquire some private property. Our 
conclusion is that by constitutional standards it did not acquire 
enough.”153 
B.  The FAA’s “Ground Up” Argument Cannot Be Reconciled with 
Griggs and Causby 
The essential holdings of both cases clearly establish that landowners 
own the immediate airspace above their land. The holdings’ continued 
survival decisively undercuts the FAA’s assertion that it “is responsible 
for the safety of U.S. airspace from the ground up.”154 First, if “[t]he 
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as [he] 
can occupy or use in connection with the land,”155 then the privately 
owned airspace by definition is not “U.S. airspace.” Second, presuming 
that a landowner does in fact own at least some airspace above his 
property, then “U.S. airspace,” at least above the landowner’s property, 
does not extend “from the ground up.” Third, the “ground up” argument 
would suggest that the FAA retains regulatory authority over a decidedly 
absurd amount of private property and, by extension, all undertakings 
conducted in the airspace above that property. In sum, accepting the 
“ground up” argument requires inferring that Congress intended the 
FAA’s jurisdiction to extend to an errant firework launched into the air 
above a neighbor’s property, smoke from controlled burnings, 
parasailing, or even “two frisbees . . . collid[ing] in a backyard.”156 
Clearly then the obvious absurdities inherent in the FAA’s “ground up” 
argument cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Causby and Griggs.  
Likewise, the same reasoning defeats the related argument that 
“[p]rivate land owners do not have any jurisdiction over the airspace 
above their property and cannot prohibit or allow aviation operations over 
their land.”157 The landowner’s ownership of the airspace used in 
connection with the land carries with it an implicit right to exclude 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 89 (citation omitted). 
 153. Id. at 90. 
 154. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 44. 
 155. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). 
 156. Sachs, supra note 79. 
 157. C&D Letters, supra note 53. 
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others—a right the Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized as “one 
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.”158 Thus, while a landowner cannot prohibit or 
allow aviation operations conducted in public airspace, a landowner, 
incident to his ownership may, at the very least, exclude aviation 
operations conducted in his privately owned airspace. Any assertion to 
the contrary would suggest that had Pirker conducted his operation 
without the consent of the University of Virginia, any attempt by the 
University to remove Pirker’s aircraft from their airspace without 
consulting the FAA would be an exercise of authority that the University 
does not possess. Thus, landowners must, contrary to the FAA’s 
assertion, possess at least some “jurisdiction over the airspace above their 
property.”159 
The FAA’s justification for its moratorium on flying drones for 
business purposes, at least those flying in privately owned airspace, must 
rest on alternative grounds. 
C.  Flower Mills and the FAA’s “All Airspace Necessary” Argument 
The FAA’s better argument is the more limited one it advanced in the 
Pirker case: “[T]he FAA’s mandate to regulate the use of all airspace 
necessary to ‘ensure the safety’ of aircraft, for ‘protecting, and 
identifying’ those aircraft, and for ‘protecting individuals on the 
ground,’” and this “is not confined solely to the ‘navigable airspace.’”160 
This interpretation is narrower than those discussed previously in that it 
suggests that the FAA is responsible for the safety of all aircraft rather 
than airspace, and hence it may regulate the use of “all airspace 
necessary” to (1) protect aircraft and (2) protect “individuals on the 
ground” from those aircraft.  
But this interpretation, though lacking the absurdities inherent in the 
arguments already discussed, is overbroad. If the FAA may regulate the 
use of all airspace necessary to protect aircraft, then the FAA should 
possess regulatory authority over building heights and all manner of 
vertical construction and undertakings. Stated differently, under this 
interpretation, the FAA should be able to halt proposed construction 
projects that it determines would endanger the safety of aircraft. The U.S. 
Claims Court took up this issue in Flower Mills Associates v. United 
States.161 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see, e.g., Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1044 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 831 (1987) (same). 
 159. C&D Letters, supra note 53.  
 160. FAA Response, supra note 70, at 5. 
 161. 23 Cl. Ct. 182 (1991). 
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In Flower Mills, the plaintiff sought to construct a warehouse building 
on its property that would be 700 feet from the end of a runway of a 
privately owned airport.162 To build the structure, the plaintiff required 
the approval of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, which 
agreed to grant the construction permit if the FAA first determined that 
“the proposed building would not be a hazard to air navigation.”163 The 
FAA, after reviewing the plaintiff’s proposed structure, decided 
“that . . . the proposed structure would have a substantially adverse effect 
on the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft.”164 The plaintiff 
brought an action against the FAA, alleging that the FAA’s decision 
amounted to an uncompensated regulatory taking prohibited under the 
Fifth Amendment.165 
The court stated that the issue was one of first impression but noted 
that other courts had reviewed prior safety determinations made by the 
FAA outside of the context of regulatory takings.166 Citing Aircraft 
Owners & Pilots Ass’n v. FAA,167 the court stated, “Once issued, a 
[safety] determination has no enforceable legal effect. The FAA is not 
empowered to prohibit or limit proposed construction it deems dangerous 
to air navigation.”168 Because compliance with the FAA’s hazard 
determination was voluntary, the court reasoned that the government had 
not deprived the plaintiff of any property rights, and hence no regulatory 
taking had occurred.169  
Flower Mills shows that the FAA, contrary to its claim, lacks the 
authority to regulate the use of “all airspace necessary,” even where a 
landowner’s use of airspace above his property is dangerous to air 
navigation—at least where that airspace is used for purposes of 
construction. Taken together with the decisions in Causby and Griggs, it 
is clear that the FAA’s jurisdiction over the airspace is not nearly as broad 
as the FAA would suggest. Defining the precise limits of that authority, 
however, presents a more difficult question. In attempting to derive an 
answer, the most logical place to start must necessarily be where the 
FAA’s regulatory authority is at its minimum: the “superadjacent” 
airspace above a landowner’s property. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 183–84. 
 163. Id. at 185. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 186. 
 167. 600 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 168. Flower Mills, 23 Cl. Ct. at 186 (emphasis added).  
 169. Id. at 188–89. 
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D.  The Limits of “Superadjacent” Airspace 
Does a landowner’s superadjacent airspace extend to the boundaries 
of navigable airspace?170 Or does a zone of unclaimed airspace exist 
between navigable airspace and superadjacent airspace? Justice Douglas 
left this ambiguity unaddressed in both Causby and Griggs. Despite 
holding that a landowner has a property interest in the superadjacent 
airspace above his land,171 Justice Douglas declined to provide a precise 
definition of the term. Though the Supreme Court continues to recognize 
a distinction between navigable airspace and privately owned airspace,172 
it has never resolved this ambiguity.173 Interestingly, modern 
technology—specifically, drones and the manner in which the public uses 
them—may provide an answer, rather than the courts.  
“The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground 
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”174 While it may 
have been difficult for a run-of-the-mill landowner to use or occupy the 
airspace 200 feet or more above his land in 1962 (the year the Court 
decided Griggs), drone technology’s affordability provides landowners a 
means to access what was once virtually inaccessible. Further, the 
modern capabilities of drone technology allow landowners to use these 
higher altitudes not merely for recreational use but “in connection with 
the land.”  
For instance, the university that hires a commercial drone operator to 
acquire aerial photographs and footage for advertising its campus can 
reasonably be said to be using the airspace above the ground “in 
connection with the land.” Other examples include the above-mentioned 
real estate owners, boar hunters, and farmers.175 Any landowner using 
                                                                                                                     
 170. At least one state supreme court has held that it does. See McCarran Int’l Airport v. 
Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1119 (Nev. 2006) (holding that airspace below the required minimum 
altitudes for flight “is vested in the owner of the subjacent land”). 
 171. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946). 
 172. See, e.g., Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 173. This is probably because resolving the ambiguity proved unnecessary. See BANNER, 
supra note 109, at 259–60 (“Many of the uncertainties surrounding aerial trespass in the years 
after Causby were eventually ironed out, after enough cases presenting slightly different fact 
situations had made their way through the lower courts. As the law coalesced, landowners in 
practice had to prove they had suffered some harm on the ground in order to prevail. . . . The 
resulting legal standard thus ended up being very close to the formulation of the Restatement of 
Torts from the early 1930s, in that by requiring harm and low overflights as prerequisites it 
effectively merged the law of nuisance . . . with the law of trespass to land . . . . As the law grew 
clearer, reported cases raising the issue became less common, as airports acquired enough 
neighboring parcels to forestall litigation[,] . . . the aerial trespass debate largely fizzled out.”). 
 174. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
 175. See supra notes 4, 30–31 and accompanying text. 
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drones to further an undertaking “in connection with the land,” in 
accordance with Justice Douglas’s reasoning in Causby, converts the 
previously unclaimed airspace into private ownership.  
Hence, for the landowner utilizing drones above his property, the 
superadjacent airspace is limited only by the bounds of navigable 
airspace. The FAA’s prohibition on a landowner utilizing drones above 
his land for business purposes therefore amounts to a denial of the 
landowner’s property interest—his right to “own[] at least as much of the 
space above the ground as [he] can occupy or use in connection with the 
land.”176 For reasons previously discussed, this invasion of private 
property cannot be justified on the “ground up” theory or the “land 
owners do not have any jurisdiction over the airspace” theory.177 Nor can 
it be justified purely on a determination that use of the airspace on its own 
presents a danger to air navigation.178 
Thus, resolution of the superadjacent airspace question suggests two 
limiting factors on the FAA’s jurisdiction over private airspace: (1) its 
mandate to ensure the safety and efficiency of airspace in the public 
domain (navigable airspace) and (2) its authority to regulate aircraft. 
IV.  THE FAA’S BLANKET PROHIBITION ON DRONES OPERATED 
FOR “BUSINESS PURPOSES” IS AN INVALID (AND UNJUSTIFIED) 
EXERCISE OF ITS (CURRENT) AUTHORITY 
What justifications have the FAA advanced for prohibiting the use of 
drones at any altitude for business purposes? The core justification, 
gleaned from the language in the cease-and-desist letters, appears to be 
that persons operating drones for business purposes are unable to comply 
with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.179 They are unable to 
comply because “most wishing to operate [drones] are not pilot trained, 
certified, or familiar with the Code of Federal Regulations to ensure the 
safety of others.”180 However, there is currently no process to train or 
certify an operator to use commercial drones at any altitude.181  
In other words, operators of commercial drones are “unable to 
comply” with regulations because there are no regulations to comply 
with. Yet, provided they refrain from endangering “the safety of the 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
 177. See supra Section III.B. 
 178. See supra Section III.C.  
 179. C&D Letters, supra note 53. 
 180. Id.  
 181. The only way to do so is to seek a waiver exempting the operator from the regulations. 
See Petitioning for Exemption Under Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition/ (last updated 
Mar. 13, 2015, 1:52 PM). 
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national airspace system,”182 persons using drones for recreational use are 
largely beyond—in some cases completely beyond183—the FAA’s 
regulatory authority. Such persons are also not, in general, “pilot trained, 
certified, or familiar with the Code of Federal Regulations.”184 Hence, the 
justification for the prohibition inheres in the nature of the use, not the 
machine itself.  
That drones operated for business purposes may, in theory, present a 
greater safety risk than when operated recreationally is certainly not 
unreasonable. But the enforcement of a blanket prohibition first requires 
the authority to impose it. Because (1) the scope of the FAA’s authority 
is limited, and (2) the prohibition is based on the manner (i.e., business 
purposes) in which the operator uses the drone, it is unlikely that the FAA 
retains the authority to maintain the prohibition.  
A.  Reconciling the FAA’s Regulatory Authority with the Right to 
Privately Own Airspace 
The landowner’s right to own the airspace above his land cannot be 
reconciled with the FAA’s dual-mandate interpretation discussed 
above,185 as the FAA does not possess the blanket authority to the “use 
of all airspace necessary to ‘ensure the safety’ of aircraft.”186 However, 
resolution of the superadjacent airspace question suggests two possible 
interpretations for reconciling the airspace rights of the landowner with 
the FAA’s mandate to ensure the safety and efficiency of airspace. 
The first and narrower interpretation is that the FAA’s jurisdiction 
over the airspace itself is limited to navigable airspace but extends to all 
aircraft, regardless of altitude, designed or operated in a manner that 
presents a risk to the safety and efficiency of navigable airspace.187 Put 
differently, the landowner would retain the right to own the superadjacent 
airspace above his land, but the FAA would retain the authority to prevent 
the landowner from utilizing aircraft designed or operated in a manner 
that threatens the integrity of airspace within the public domain. Of 
course, under this interpretation, maintaining the moratorium on drones 
flown below navigable airspace utilized for business purposes requires 
the FAA to persuasively argue that the nature of the use, rather than the 
                                                                                                                     
 182. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(b), 126 Stat. 
11, 77. 
 183. See infra Section IV.B. 
 184. C&D Letters, supra note 53.  
 185. See supra Part II. 
 186. FAA Response, supra note 70, at 5; see also supra Section III.C.  
 187. This interpretation accords with the interpretation advanced by Pirker’s attorney. See 
Pirker MTD, supra note 10, at 10; see also infra Section IV.D (discussing the safety risks of 
drones occupying navigable airspace). 
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physical characteristics or the manner in which these aircraft are 
operated, endangers or otherwise affects the safety and efficiency of 
navigable airspace.188 
The second and broader interpretation encapsulates the first but 
extends the FAA’s jurisdiction to any aircraft occupying any airspace, 
provided those aircraft are operated in a careless or reckless manner. 
This interpretation accords with the NTSB’s decision on appeal189 and 
would allow the FAA to pursue an enforcement action against any aircraft 
operated “in a careless or reckless manner,” regardless of whether that 
operation presents a danger to navigable airspace.190 Here too, the 
landowner would retain his airspace rights but would be prevented from 
utilizing aircraft in a manner that could potentially “endanger the life or 
property of another.” But even here the FAA would find difficulty in 
maintaining its blanket prohibition. The FAA would have to persuasively 
argue either (1) that the operation of any drone aircraft for any 
commercial purpose constitutes negligence or (2) that the current lack of 
regulations precludes any commercial operator from flying in a less than 
negligent manner.191 
In any case, both approaches accord with Supreme Court rulings on 
the issue of private airspace ownership. Because the broader 
interpretation accords with the NTSB’s reversal of Judge Geraghty’s 
decision, the remainder of this Part examines whether the prohibition on 
drones used for business purposes can survive under that interpretation. 
B.  Argument by Analogy: The FMRA’s Special Rule for  
Model Aircraft  
Under the FMRA’s Special Rule for Model Aircraft, Section 336, the 
FAA is expressly forbidden from “promulgat[ing] any rule or regulation 
regarding a model aircraft,” provided certain conditions are met.192 The 
                                                                                                                     
 188. The FAA has yet to demonstrate that the machines themselves present such a danger, 
much less those used for “business purposes.” See Hampton Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2 
(stating that the “FAA is not effectively collecting and analyzing UAS safety data to identify 
risks”); see also infra Section IV.D (noting a study on the safety impact of drones in the airspace). 
 189. See infra Section IV.C.  
 190. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014). 
 191. See infra Section IV.B. 
 192. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(a), 126 Stat. 
11, 77. The FAA may not regulate a model aircraft if:  
(1) the aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational use; (2) the aircraft is 
operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines and 
within the programming of a nationwide community-based organization; (3) the 
aircraft is limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified through 
a design, construction, inspection, flight test, and operational safety program 
administered by a community-based organization; (4) the aircraft is operated in 
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FMRA defines “model aircraft” as an “unmanned aircraft that is—(1) 
capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; (2) flown within visual line 
of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and (3) flown for hobby or 
recreational purposes.”193 Most important, however, is the following 
language included in the same section: “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to pursue 
enforcement action against persons operating model aircraft who 
endanger the safety of the national airspace system.”194  
By implication, the language makes clear that a drone operating 
within the statutory parameters just discussed does not endanger the 
safety of the national airspace system, or any airspace, without some 
further negligent act on the part of the operator. It stands to reason then 
that operating a drone in accordance with all the requirements of 
Section 336 save one—flying for business purposes instead of 
recreation—does not endanger the safety of the national airspace system, 
or any airspace. Thus, unless the FAA intends to argue that safety inheres 
purely in whether money changes hands,195 operating a drone that would 
otherwise qualify as a model aircraft (e.g., Pirker’s glider) does not, 
without more, endanger the airspace or the public. Stated differently, the 
operation of any drone aircraft for any commercial purpose does not 
necessarily constitute negligence. Operating such a drone in a less than 
negligent manner would therefore not bring the operator within the 
purview of the FAA’s jurisdiction, regardless of whether the drone is 
operated for business purposes. The FAA appears to concede this 
conclusion in the enforcement action levied against Pirker.  
C.  The FAA Implicitly Concedes that the Prohibition Is Invalid 
In its complaint, the FAA charged Pirker only with violating 14 C.F.R. 
§ 91.13 by “operat[ing his aircraft] in a careless or reckless manner so as 
to endanger the life or property of another.”196 The commercial nature of 
                                                                                                                     
a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft; and 
(5) when flown within 5 miles of an airport, the operator of the aircraft provides 
the airport operator and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic 
facility is located at the airport) with prior notice of the operation (model aircraft 
operators flying from a permanent location within 5 miles of an airport should 
establish a mutually-agreed upon operating procedure with the airport operator 
and the airport air traffic control tower (when an air traffic facility is located at 
the airport)). 
Id. 
 193. Id. § 336(c). 
 194. Id. § 336(b). 
 195. This is an argument the FAA appears to deliberately avoid making. See infra Section 
IV.C. 
 196. NTSB Order of Assessment, supra note 66, at 2. 
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the flight is only referenced in paragraphs five and six of the assessment, 
presumably to demonstrate that the Special Rule for Model Aircraft does 
not protect Pirker.197 The “for compensation” language does not appear 
in paragraph nine, where the FAA specifically alleged what actions taken 
by Pirker constitute operating the aircraft in a careless or unsafe 
manner.198 That it refrains from doing so suggests that the FAA is not 
convinced that the $10,000 fine can rest on a claim that Pirker operated 
his drone “for compensation.” This accords with the NTSB’s decision to 
remand Pirker’s case. 
The Administrator’s interpretation of this text—that it 
applies to respondent’s operation of his Zephyr to prohibit 
careless or reckless operations—is reasonable, given the 
broad language of the section. . . . The Board has affirmed 
the Administrator’s application of § 91.13(a) as an alleged 
independent violation in other cases in which, presumably, 
no other regulation would have explicitly prohibited the 
alleged conduct.199 
Thus, absent § 91.13(a), which expressly requires careless or reckless 
conduct on the part of the operator, the FAA could not pursue an 
enforcement action against Pirker. Put differently, absent a finding that 
Pirker “endanger[ed] the property or life of another,” Pirker’s operation 
was lawful, whether for business purposes or otherwise.200 The language 
from the NTSB’s remand, the inferences drawn from Congress’s Special 
Rule for Model Aircraft, and the arguments the FAA raised against 
Pirker, all support the conclusion that the FAA may, at most, pursue 
enforcement actions against drones flying below navigable airspace when 
they are operated in a careless or reckless manner. The FAA may not 
pursue any enforcement action against drone operators flying safely 
below navigable airspace. Thus, the FAA’s blanket prohibition is not a 
valid exercise of its current authority.  
D.  A Study on Micro Drones and the Risks They Pose to Navigable 
Airspace 
A final issue is worth addressing. Though this Note argues that the 
FAA currently lacks the regulatory authority to enforce its prohibition, it 
takes no position on whether Congress could grant that authority in the 
future. However, presuming that Congress could extend the FAA’s 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Id. at 1; see also Pirker Order, supra note 72, at 6 (stating that the “flight for 
compensation/payment . . . appears to be for the purpose of re-classifying Respondent’s model 
aircraft as [a drone] within the terminology of Notice 17-01”). 
 198. NTSB Order of Assessment, supra note 66. 
 199. Pirker Opinion and Order, supra note 76, at 9 (emphasis added). 
 200. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2014). 
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authority that far, it is by no means clear that such an extension is 
necessary, as a recent report utilizing FAA data suggests. 
Though researchers currently lack data to study the risks drones pose 
to navigable airspace, an engineering and scientific consulting firm—
Exponent Failure Analysis Associates (Exponent)—used birds as a stand-
in for lightweight drones (called micro UAVs in the study) to analyze the 
issue.201 The primary concern of the study was the risks posed by the 
interaction of drones and manned aircraft occupying navigable 
airspace.202 Noting the “dearth of data” about the risks posed by drones, 
Exponent relied instead on the FAA Wildlife Strike Database (Strike 
Database), which records reports of wildlife aircraft strikes.203 The FAA 
estimates that aircraft operators submit 39% of bird strikes to the Strike 
Database.204 
Exponent chose birds as an analog to drones for two reasons: (1) 
aerospace vehicles are commonly segregated by weight for analysis and 
regulation,205 and (2) birds are similar in weight to “micro UAVs,” drones 
weighing three pounds or less.206 Exponent’s initial search of the Strike 
Database limited itself to reports of bird strikes that occurred within five 
or more miles of an airport and at or below 400 feet.207 Exponent found 
that under those parameters, no injuries or fatalities were caused to 
manned aircraft.208 Changing the parameters did not lead to significantly 
different results. Exponent concluded: 
Analysis of the full 24.5 years of available FAA data using 
the proposed UAV regulations of 400 ft. and 5 miles from 
airports (including “en route” operations of unreported 
distance from airport), with small- and medium-size birds as 
a surrogate for UAVs, shows that there were 34 cases of 
damage to aircraft in collisions with small and medium size 
birds. This search found only 6 collisions resulting in injuries 
and none resulting in fatalities within these parameters. 
Based on the FAA Wildlife Strike database there is no 
indication that allowing UAVs of three pounds or less to 
                                                                                                                     
 201. EXPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS ASSOCS., UAS SAFETY ANALYSIS 38 (2014), available at 
http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/upload/UAS%20America%20Fund%20Petition%20Rulemaki
ng.pdf. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. DOT Asks FAA to Do More to Reduce Bird Strikes, NAT’L BUS. AVIATION ASS’N (Sept. 
21, 2012), http://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/20120921-dot-asks-faa-to-do-more-to-reduce-bird-
strikes.php. 
 205. UAS SAFETY ANALYSIS, supra note 201, at 3. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 5. 
 208. Id. 
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operate at least 5 miles from airports and at or below 400 feet 
will pose a significant increase in risk to manned aircraft.209 
This is only one study, but it convincingly suggests that drones such 
as Pirker’s—weighing a mere 1.5 pounds above the study’s parameters—
present a marginal safety risk to navigable airspace, even when flying in 
navigable airspace. More importantly, it suggests that drones flying 
below navigable airspace present an exceedingly minimal, if any, danger 
to navigable airspace. Thus, the safety risk drones pose to airspace at any 
altitude is uncertain at best. At worst, it is exaggerated. In either case, the 
prudent course cannot be to stifle innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Particularly not when, as one author has suggested, common law and the 
existing regulatory framework has “successfully balanced innovation and 
safety in a fair, efficient manner for decades.”210  
CONCLUSION 
For global giants such as Amazon and Google as well as sole 
proprietors such as Brown and Pirker, drones offer the promise of 
opportunity and the means of reaching a new commercial frontier. For 
the public, drones offer the promise of substantial job creation and growth 
in a still-recovering economy. For state and local governments, drones 
offer millions of dollars in new tax revenue. In short, drones offer 
something for everybody. While it may be true that the FAA will lift its 
prohibition in time, the agency lacks the authority to impose it in the first 
place. For that reason, these would-be entrepreneurs and innovators 
should not have to wait. 
The physical characteristics of drones, the degree to which the public 
utilizes them, and the manner of their operation will almost certainly 
evolve; presenting new dangers where few or none existed before. 
Nevertheless, the irrational fear of a future hypothetical danger should 
not serve as justification to strangle the promising innovation and 
entrepreneurship of the present. Were that not the case, the world may 
have never learned the names, Wilbur and Orville Wright. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 209. Id. at 7. 
 210. F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and 
Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1872 (2014). 
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